The United States is beginning to act like Rome during the later part of the Republican era when consuls and dictators culminating in Julius Caesar extended Roman rule from Britain to Persia. No longer satisfied with our role of first among equals within the ranks of democratic, first-world countries, we are militarily and, perhaps, politically prepared to project an American hegemony half way around the world to Baghdad.
No informed person can say that the threat of terrorism against the United States isn’t real. The Al-Quaida strike against the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and (probably) the White House or Capitol Building last September was an indelible lesson for all of us. However, we must weigh the speculative gains and costs of attempting to kill the hydra of terrorism by striking at Saddam Hussein. First, is the question of whether killing or capturing Saddam Hussein and installing a puppet regime in Iraq is a proper objective for an advanced, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural democracy to undertake. Second, is the calculus of potential threats that may be unleashed if we act against Iraq versus those that may be fostered if we don’t.
The likely increase in oil prices and the widespread economic fallout from that rise must be considered. Even if in the United States the economic impact of a restriction in supply can be moderated by releases from the strategic petroleum reserve, the rest of the world will suffer heavily. A worldwide economic downturn is not out of the question. Inflation may escalate in this country, as oil prices drive up the costs gasoline, heating oil, diesel fuel, jet fuel and that of thousands of synthetic goods essential to the functioning of our technological world. Interest rates may also increase both as a natural result of the Federal Reserve Bank attempting to rein in inflation and as the uncertainty and fear consequent upon the prospect of war frighten investors.
If it became clear that we were committed to an attack upon Iraq, wouldn’t it be more likely that Saddam Hussein would explore and escalate all possibilities of massive terrorist attacks upon the United States. Citizens in large cities; those using mass transit including buses and trains as well as the airlines, people in malls, stores, sporting events, and restaurants; children in school, those using large bridges either going into cities or while driving on the interstate highway system, and others would be at risk. On the other hand, we are already at risk to an unknown degree. It is hard to know how much terrorist activities in the United States would be expanded if supported by a desperate and cruel Iraqi dictator. No matter what precautions are taken, a determined terrorist organization can sow death and fear in a civilian population. Israel's bitter experience with Hamas and other Palestinian paramilitary groups demonstrates the impossibility of deflecting all terrorist actions.
Another significant cost difficult to quantify is the certain loss of much of the sense of comfort and trust that some Muslim countries and peoples have felt for the United States. Despite the anger and suspicion of many throughout the Islamic world, there have been historic alliances and ties with countries as diverse as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan. We will strain and, almost certainly, degrade those ties if we attack Iraq, especially without a convincing case for Saddam Hussein's authorship of the September 11th attacks or his continuing development of a credible and targeted threat against this country. Such a case must be based on more than hearsay, anonymous paid informants, or rumors of bogey men. And no matter how good the case, the Arab street will rise in anger and hatred. We are already only somewhat less reviled than Israel, our peculiar client state.
Finally, the costs involved in maintaining a powerful strike force and extensive garrison troops will weigh heavily upon taxpayers. If we intend to change regimes by force, we must be prepared to build nations from the rubble. Nation-building is expensive in both blood and treasure. The political costs involved in maintaining such an imperial state include a cult of the leader, restriction of individual and political liberties as police powers expand, and an enhanced political role for the military and its suppliers and beneficiaries.
If we choose not to force Saddam Hussein out of Iraq, what other options do we have to reduce the threat of terrorism growing out of the Middle East? We could attempt to force Saddam to comply with extensive inspections by blockading Iraq and only allowing food, medical, and related relief supplies into the country under supervised conditions. That would be a difficult undertaking politically, militarily, and financially. It would also require a coordinated attempt to control all international financial transactions coming from and going into Iraqi. Worse, it would not completely choke off the export of terror.
Another possibility would be to reverse our current one-sided support for Israel and push for a comprehensive peace in the region. Our support for a viable Palestinian state with secure borders for both it and Israel, guarantees of peace between the parties that would probably require American peace-keeping troops, abandonment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the giving up of the so-called "right of return" by long-term Palestinian refugees from Israel, and some form of joint rule over Jerusalem would be the major aspects of a final peace deal.
The economic and military costs of supporting the development of a Palestinian state would be significant, but far less than that of war with Iraq. The potential benefits to us of being perceived as working toward peace, freedom, and economic revival in Palestine would be enormous. The opposition of the Israeli-American conservative axis to a US role in forging a lasting peace in the region would be extreme and, perhaps, overwhelming. The central question here is for whose benefit is the foreign policy of the United States conducted?
Despite demographic explanations, Rome fell due to rot at the top and the disaffection of its citizens. As the power of the emperor grew and the organs of the Republican state withered, there was a disconnect between the leadership and the people. The people lost a sense of involvement and investment in the state. The later-imperial legions were composed of foreign mercinaries who ended up as the deciding voice in who became the next emperor and how long he reigned. The people became a voiceless mob pacified with distribution of free grain and frequent gladiatorial combats. Rome fell into corruption, anarchy, and weakness.
All comparisons are necessarily biased and partial. The US is not Rome. Nor are we faced with an imperial government, yet. But we are faced with difficult choices over how we will conduct our foreign policy and protect our citizens and our democracy. Unless we consider those choices and their likely consequences with clear eyes, we may pay a greater price for victory over Saddam Hussein than we ever imagined.